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I. INTRODUCTION
The "Chameleon" of Antitrust in the modern market is the tech-
nology joint venture.2 Joint ventures' and transborder companies are
booming in today's highly competitive marketplace.' European affiliates
in the United States provide 2.9 million Americans with jobs and em-
ploy more than 10 percent of the work force in Maryland, New Jersey,
West Virginia and South Carolina." As these ventures increase, anti-
trust concerns rise.
The vastly different forms that joint ventures take complicate com-
petition regulation. Navigating the maze of competition law applicable
to such joint ventures Proves to be a perplexing task in today's interna-
tional market place. Joint venturers must ensure compliance with nu-
merous European Union (E.U.)6 laws,7 member state laws, and U.S.
antitrust laws.8 This task is increasingly difficult as the number of regu-
2. Id.
3. A joint venture is a business or activity set up by two companies to cooperate in
the development, production, output, or marketing of a product. The parent companies'
cooperation in the joint venture eliminates competition between them in the joint ven-
ture's market. "[Ilt is the pooling of complementary skills and product lines as well as
the risk distribution and ... the capital-gathering implications of a joint venture which
make this form of business activity attractive to many decision-makers in today's inter-
national business environment." UTZ TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, BUSINESS IS-
SUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES, ch. 41, 166
(1982). Unlike joint ventures, traditional mergers permanently combine two companies
efforts in all areas. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 468 (1991).
4. Diane Bentley, Survey of International Legal Services (3): Marriages of Con-
venience - A Look at Cross-border Corporate Joint Ventures, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1994, at 14. European Union and international operations comprised 72 percent of to-
tal worldwide joint ventures in 1991-1992. Joint ventures across 12 industry sectors
doubled in the five years up to 1990. Id.
5. Nancy Dunne, Europeans Provide 3M US Jobs, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at
6.
6. Hereinafter "E.U." The E.U., formerly the European Community (E.C.), has
generally referred to itself as the European Union (EU) since the November 1, 1993
Maastricht Treaty on European Union entered into force. Alyssa A. Grikscheit, Are
We Compatible?: Current European Community Law on the Compatibility of Joint
Ventures with the Common Market and Possibilities for Future Development, 92
MICH. L. REV. 968 (1994).
7. Joint ventures must also comply with the European Economic Area (hereinafter
"EEA") competition laws, Agreement on the European Economic Area, signed at
Porto, May 2, 1992. See discussion infra II.B.
8. Chief among the United States' competition laws enforced by the Department
of Justice are the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); the Clayton Act,
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lations multiplies.
Disclosure and pervasive regulation are the hallmarks of the E.U.'s
approach to competition regulation. Through extensive schemes of noti-
fication, exemption, clearances, and comfort letters, the Commission
ensures that it scrutinizes and impacts proposed business deals.9 Except
when certain types of joint ventures are involved, the clock runs
slowly. 10 This lack of expediency can result in the significant restruc-
turing, elimination or heavy fining of ongoing joint ventures once the
Commission finds a violation has occurred, which often occurs in retro-
spect years later.
Recognizing the economic and technological gains derived from
joint ventures, both the United States and the European Union have
enacted statutory exemptions relaxing antitrust law, instituted coopera-
tion agreements, and delineated procedures to expedite joint venture
approval."1
Stringent criteria must be satisfied for most E.U. exemptions to
apply;"2 clear cut "safe harbors" remain few. While careful structuring
of joint venture agreements can result in considerable time savings and
reduced business risks, the seemingly inconsistent decisions emerging
from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition
("DG-IV")' render this task more difficult."
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988); the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988); Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305; and the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988).
9. The notification scheme is somewhat analogous to U.S. securities regulation
which requires extensive approvals and notification prior to businesses taking certain
actions. Unlike U.S. regulation, however, the E.U. has been under few time constraints
to approve or reject joint venture arrangements. See discussion infra I.B.
10. See Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter "Merger Regulation"] (imposing strict
time limits in which the Commission must act on proposed concentrative joint ven-
tures). See also discussion infra II.A.i.
11. The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305
[hereinafter "NCRA"] provides exceptions from existing U.S. antitrust law for joint
research and development [hereinafter "R&D"] activities. Under NCRA, U.S. courts
are charged with evaluating the competitive effects of joint R&D based on a "rule of
reason" analysis balancing pro-competitive effects with anti-competitive concerns in the
relevant technology markets. NCRA also reduces monetary damages for later civil ac-
tions from treble to actual damages where the challenged conduct is within the scope of
the notification provided by the joint venture. The E.U. Block Exemption for R&D
joint ventures, Commission Regulation 418/85, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5, provides safe har-
bor for joint ventures meeting the Regulation's stringent requirements. Id.
12. Commission Regulation 418/85, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5 (provides safe harbor if
stringent criteria is met). See discussion infra I.B.
13. RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL, ch. 2, at
1995]
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This Note will discuss the basic scheme of E.U. competition law
pertaining to technological joint ventures, recent changes in that
scheme, decisions regarding joint ventures, and methods for structuring
joint ventures to ensure compliance with E.U. laws. The Note will con-
clude with recommendations for improvements.
II. THE E.U. APPROACH - A MAZE OF REGULATION
A. Obstacles to Joint Venture Formation: The Treaty of Rome
Provisions1"
The E.U.'s competition laws are set forth in the Treaty of Rome
and the regulations and directives which implement it." Designed to
further the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people, the
Treaty not only proscribes governmental trade barriers but also ensures
that businesses will not recreate trade barriers through private ac-
tions. 17 Specifically, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty contain the key
substantive aspects of E.U. competition law.18
1. Article 85
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome ensures that the free flow of
goods and services within the E.U. is not hampered by anticompetitive
private-party actions. 9 This Treaty provision restricts the formation of
monopolies, cartels, and other agreements whose anticompetitive effect
is not offset by concomitant benefit to the E.U.20
The broad sweep of Article 85 encompasses joint ventures and
other agreements between competitors and subjects them to the inva-
sive scrutiny of the Commission.2 Although joint venture agreements
often possess the characteristics of agreements prohibited under Article
53 (West 1992). The Directorate General for Competition is referred to as DG-IV. Id.
14. See discussion infra III.
15. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter
EEC TREATY] arts. 85-86 (Also called the "Treaty of Rome," the Treaty was signed in
Rome in 1957 and entered into effect on Jan. 1, 1958); RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL, ch. 1 (West 1992).
16. FOLSOM, supra note 15. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome has been roughly
analogized to American Antitrust law in that it prohibits cooperation between competi-
tors which restrains trade or distorts competition. Id. at 244.
17. Id.
18. See also Council Regulation 17, 1990 33 O.J. (L 204) 17-18; Commission
Regulation 418/85, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5.
19. EEC TREATY art. 85.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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85(1), 22 they also provide economic, technological, and consumer-ori-
ented benefits. When these benefits outweigh the anticompetitive ef-
fects, the Commission either issues negative clearances, holding Article
85 inapplicable, or issues exemptions under Article 85(3), permitting
the agreement to stand.23
Article 85(1) prohibits private parties from forming agreements
and engaging in concerted practices which may affect trade between
member states if they have as their "object or effect" the "prevention,
restriction or distortion" of competition within the E.U.2"
Joint ventures that do not have an appreciable effect on competi-
tion fall outside the scope of Article 85(1).26 The Commission has
broadly construed Article 85(1) as covering almost all joint ventures.26
22. Specifically, Article 85(1) states that agreements on price fixing, limiting pro-
duction, limiting the means of production, unfair practices, and tying are automatically
void under 85(1). EEC TREATY art. 85(1) states:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular, those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. If the joint venture agreement is outside the scope of Article 85(1), then all
additional agreements, even those restrictive of competition, are ancillary to the joint
venture agreement and also outside the scope of Article 85(1). Conversely, if a joint
venture falls within the scope of Article 85(1), then the ancillary restrictions are
caught as well. Notice on the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures Pursuant to
Article 85, para. 67, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2.
26. Agreements must have appreciable effect on competition for Article 85(1) to
apply. Notice Concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, 1970 O.J. (C 64) 1, up-
dated 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2 (providing guidance as to when an agreement would be
deemed to have appreciable effects). The Notice used the size of the undertaking as a
measure, stating that Article 85(1) should not generally be applied to agreements or
undertakings with a combined market share of not more than 5 percent and an aggre-
1995]
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However, the Commission has held, pursuant to an Official Notice, that
agreements or undertakings with a combined market share of not more
than 5 percent and an aggregate combined turnover of less than 200
million ECUs are "de minimis" and not covered by Article 85(1). "
Article 85(2) states that agreements violative of Article 85(1) are
void without prior administrative or judicial action. 8 This nullity af-
fects only the aspects of the joint venture which are violative of Article
85(1).19 If severable, the remaining aspects of the joint venture agree-
ment remain valid.30
Despite the Treaty's ban on anticompetitive agreements, Article
85(3) 8' provides the Commission with the exclusive power to make ex-
ceptions through a process known as granting exemptions or negative
clearances.3 2 This may be done if:
gate combined turnover of less than 200 million ECUs. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 3.
28. EEC TREATY art. 85(2). The Article 85(2) nullity provision has been inter-
preted to strike violative provisions of an agreement while the remaining, acceptable
provisions are left intact. The net result can be a substantively different, yet still a
binding business agreement between the parties. See V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990).
29. See KORAH, supra note 28.
30. EEC TREATY art. 85. The concept of severability can result in numerous sub-
stantive changes being directed by DG-IV to the business relationship between the ven-
ture partners. The net result is a joint venture with unequal, potentially devastating
business effects on the parties as the agreement remains in place with only the objec-
tionable provisions stricken. All this could occur years after the Commission is notified
of the joint venture under Article 85(3). In addition, even when a joint venture is
granted an Article 85(3) exemption, the exemption is only temporary. Upon its expira-
tion, DG-IV will re-examine the joint venture and could direct changes at that time to
the parties' agreement. See also KORAH supra note 28.
31. EEC TREATY art. 85(3) states:
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not;
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not in-
dispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id.
32. Council Regulation 17/62, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 204) 17-18 (allowing the
Commission to grant individual exemptions under Article 85(3) or issue negative clear-
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- the agreement improves the production or distribution of
goods or promotes technical or economic progress while al-
lowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; and
-the agreement does not impose restrictions which are "not in-
dispensable" to attaining the objectives; and
-the agreement does not provide the opportunity to eliminate
competition of a substantial part of the products concerned."3
Under Article 85(3), the Commission balances the pros and cons
of the joint venture collaboration. Parent companies with large market
shares and significant economic power are carefully examined." Dem-
onstrating objective advantages for third parties - especially consum-
ers - carries substantial weight towards exemption.35 "This will be the
case if the joint venture contributes to 'dynamic competition,' 'consoli-
dating the internal market' and 'increased competitiveness of the rele-
vant sector.' "36 Such research and development (R&D) agreements
are generally favored by the Commission, while sales joint ventures are
disfavored.3 7
2. Article 86
The other key antitrust provision of the Treaty of Rome, Article
86, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.38 Joint ventures can fall
ances). A negative clearance is a finding by the Commission that a particular agree-
ment or practice does not fall within the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) or 86. RALPH H.
FOLSoM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL, ch. 7 (West 1992). Parties
usually request both a negative clearance and an individual exemption at the same
time. Joseph P. Griffin, Joint Ventures: Concentrative and Cooperative, Remarks at the
Meeting of the Int'l. Law Section of the ABA (Feb. 16, 1994) (notes on file with
author).
33. Council Regulation 17/62, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 204) 17-18.
34. See Christopher Jones, et al., Competition Law Checklist 1992, EUR. L. REV.
cc31 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. at cc31.
37. Id.
38. EEC TREATY art. 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
1995]
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within this provision due to their market share.89 Analysis of the rele-
vant market is the key criteria which determines whether Article 86 is
applicable."' The relevant geographic market is the E.U. Dominance is
usually established when market share is 40 percent or greater.41 Mar-
ket shares between 30 and 40 percent are usually below the level of
market dominance absent other evidence.'
Once a dominant position within the E.U. is found to be held by
one or more of the undertakings, an abuse which affects trade between
member states must occur to trigger Article 86.13 Abuse may take a
variety of forms enumerated in Article 86: imposing unfair prices, lim-
iting production, coercing other businesses and partners, and discrimi-
nating among different customers."
Although dominance alone does not violate Article 86, behaviors
which are usually permitted can be held to violate Article 86 if the
activities are those of a dominant firm and have an anticompetitive ef-
fect. 5 In addition, there is no exemption procedure in Article 86 as
there is in Article 85.
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.
39. John H. Riggs, Jr. & Anthony Giustini, Joint Ventures Under EEC Competi-
tion Law, 46 Bus. LAW 851, 864 (1991).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. EEC TREATY art. 86.
44. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW ch. 23 at 812 (1993).
45. Riggs & Giustini, supra note 39, at 865.
The [European Court of Justice] adopted an objective test for the determina-
tion of abuse under Article 86 in Hoffmann-La Roche. The ECJ said:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior
of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influ-
ence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very pres-
ence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is
weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from
those which condition normal competition in products or services on
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect
of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still ex-
isting in the market or the growth of that competition.
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
B. The Traditional Escape Routes From the Treaty Provisions
The fact that the Treaty does not delineate an objective calculus
for deciding whether an agreement is valid under Article 85 or 86 fos-
ters uncertainty among companies desiring to enter into joint venture
agreements. Also, the Commission's process of deciding which agree-
ments merit approval and which should be nullified is largely subjective
and somewhat enigmatic."" Recognizing the breadth of Articles 85 and
86, the Commission issued regulations and notices providing guidance
and supplying procedures for compliance with the Treaty.47 The first of
these procedures, Regulation 17, as implemented by Regulation 27 and
Regulation 2526/85,48 established the process of notification. Regula-
tion 17 also provided the Commission with broad investigatory power. 9
If businesses notify the Commission of their agreements, they will
not be subject to fines for the period between notification and any sub-
sequent Commission action disapproving the venture.5 0 If businesses in
this situation are granted an exemption, it will only be deemed valid for
the time period specified by the Commission." In addition, the Agree-
ment must comply with member state competition law despite the
Commission's exemption. 2
Once a business has notified the Commission of its agreement,
there are two possible results which will enable businesses to avoid Ar-
ticle 85 violations. The Commission can either grant individual exemp-
tions or issue negative clearances pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation
17." Parties usually request both a negative clearance and an individ-
ual exemption at the same time. A negative clearance is a finding by
the Commission that a particular agreement or practice does not fall
within the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) or 86. 54 Businesses requesting
such a clearance or exemption must wait an average of eighteen
46. See generally BERMANN, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (13) 204 (the "Regulation 17"); Com-
mission Regulation 27 1962 O.J. (1118) 5; Regulation 2526/85, 1985 O.J. (L 240) 1.
Regulations under Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome have direct application in the
legal systems of member states. Article 87 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the EEC to make regulations in order to give effect to the principles
found in Articles 85 and 86. EEC TREATY arts. 189, 87.
49. EEC TREATY arts. 189, 87.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 1990 O.J. (L 204) 17-18 (reprinted in English Regulation 17).
54. See BERMANN, supra note 44.
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months before the Commission makes a determination. 5
Failing to notify the Commission of a joint venture under the as-
sumption that the agreement is exempt from Article 85(1) could result
in substantial penalties if the Commission later finds that the joint ven-
ture falls within the scope of Article 85(1).11 This hard reality induces
most businesses to notify the Commission of their joint ventures or look
for the safe harbor provisions of the block exemption.5
Once the Commission decides to grant an exemption, it must pub-
lish a summary of the proposed cooperation in the Official Journal of
the European Community prior to taking formal action.58 During this
period, third party competitors can submit comments to the Commis-
sion on the proposed cooperation. 9
In lieu of seeking a formal opinion granting the exemption or neg-
ative clearance and waiting months for DG-IV action, the parties may
request the Commission to issue a "comfort letter." 60 Similar to a U.S.
Security and Exchange Commission "no-action" letter,61 the comfort
letter will not preclude litigation in national courts, but it probably can
be relied upon as assurance that the Commission will not act absent
fraud or material change in circumstance after the issuance of the com-
fort letter.62
55. Griffin, supra note 32.
56. Council Regulation 17, supra note 48.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Riggs & Giustini, supra note 39, at 860 n.41. "A comfort letter is an
administrative letter signed by an appropriate official of DG-IV stating that no action
will be taken against the agreement or practice in question." Id.
61. "No-action" letters are issued by the staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in response to queries from businesses regarding the applicability of the
securities laws to their transactions. Receipt of a "no-action" letter generally assures
the issuer that the SEC will not take action to regulate the transaction. CHARLES J.
JOHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS, 15 (1990).
62. Valentine Korah, Developments in EEC Competition Law in 1993, Remarks
at Int'l. Law Section Meeting of the ABA (Feb. 16, 1994) (notes on files with the
author) (citing Sir Leon Brittan [former Director of DG-IV], The Future of EC Com-
petition Policy, Speech Before the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels (Dec.
7, 1992), commenting:
It is true that a comfort letter does not provide complete legal security: the
Commission may withdraw it at any time. In fact, however, this is far from
true. A formal exemption decision may be revoked if certain conditions, speci-
fied in Article 8 of Regulation 17, are met. A comfort letter will only be
withdrawn in the most extreme cases and only when the conditions of Article
8 are fulfilled. Such comfort letters therefore enable us to meet the needs of
industry for rapid and secure decision-making in such cases.
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The mechanics of Article 85 have also been augmented by the is-
suance of block exemptions by the Commission. Under Regulation
418/85(1), Article 85(1) does not apply to agreements designed for
joint R&D of products or processes and joint exploitation of the results
of the R&D.6'The regulation, however, contains caveats. For example,
Professor Korah posited that "It is now arguable . . . that if one plans to enforce an
agreement about which the Commission has sent a favourable comfort letter, one can
require the Commission to proceed to a formal decision." (citing John Temple Lang,
speaking in his personal capacity at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute in October
1993 (forthcoming 1994). Id. This would eliminate the commercial risk of trying to
enforce agreements in national courts based on comfort letters which impliedly state
that the agreements violate Article 85(1) and for which the national courts are power-
less to grant exemption.
63. If an agreement or transaction falls within the scope of Article 85(1), only the
Commission can grant an exemption. Regulation 2821/71 gives the Commission the
power to grant prospective "bloc exemptions" to certain categories of agreement with-
out review. Council Regulation 2821/71, Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices, 1971 O.J. (L 285) 46.
The principal block exemptions, in addition to the R&D block exemption, relate
to:
1. exclusive distribution agreements - Regulation 1983/83 on Block Ex-
emption of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1. See also
Comission notice concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No. 1983/83
and (EEC) No. 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution and Exclusive Purchas-
ing Agreements, 1984 O.J. (C 101) 2; Commission's Notice on Exclusive
Dealing Contracts with Commercial Agents, 1962 O.J. 2921;
2. exclusive purchasing agreements - Regulation 1984/83 on Block Exemp-
tion of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5;
3. motor vehicle distribution and service agreements - Regulation 123/85
on Block Exemption of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agree-
ments, 1985 O.J. (L 15) 16;
4. patent licensing agreements - Regulation 2349/84 on Block Exemption
of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15;
5. industrial knowledge licensing agreements - Regulation 556/89 on Block
Exemption of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1;
6. specialization, agreements - Regulation 417/85 on Block Exemption of
Specialization Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1; and
7. franchising. agreements - Regulation 4087/88 on Block Exemption of
Franchising Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46.
See generally, V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990); Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC
Competition Law, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1992).
64. Such a block exemption for R&D joint ventures was issued in 1985 and up-
dated in 1993. Commission Regulation 418/85 on the Application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53)
5, updated 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8 (the "R&D Block Exemption").
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all parties must have access to the results of the research and be free to
exploit the results of the joint R&D.65 If the parties are competitors,
the parties must not supply more than 20 percent of the market for the
goods being improved or replaced in order for the exemption to apply. 66
In addition, Article 3 sets time limits for the duration of R&D agree-
ments.6 7 Five years of joint exploitation is allowed for non-competitor
joint venture partners once the jointly developed goods are on the mar-
ket.68 This five year period can be extended provided the parties' mar-
ket share of the new product does not exceed 20 percent.69
Article 5 allows parties to include provisions that restrict the use
of company proprietary data to joint venture use only. 70 Article 6 pro-
hibits the parties from restricting their ability to conduct independent
research in the same field or another area following the conclusion of
the R&D program.7 1 Such prohibitions are consistent with E.U. poli-
cies of proscribing exclusive dealing arrangements and barriers to mar-
ket entry."
Provided that the joint venture partners are confident that they
meet the criteria of the block exemption, they may proceed with their
business venture without notification to the Commission.7 8 If the part-
4ers fear that the agreement contains clauses which may violate the
exemption conditions, they may notify the Commission.7 If the Com-
mission fails to oppose the agreement within six months, the block ex-
emption applies.7 5
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See R&D Block Exemption, supra note 64. These recent amendments to the
block exemption permit joint sales of products beyond the manufacturing stage. Pro-
duction joint ventures are exempt up to an aggregate market share of 20 percent. Full-
function joint ventures which extend to the distribution stage are limited to a maximum
market share of 10 percent to enjoy automatic exemption under the regulation. Com-
mission Regulation 151/93 of December 23, 1992, amending Regulations 417/85,
418/85, 2349/84 and 556/89 on the application of Article 85(3) to certain categories
of specialization agreements, R&D agreements, patent licensing agreements and indus-
trial knowledge licensing agreements (allowing joint ventures to produce and distribute,
providing that the companies concerned have a combined market share not exceeding
10 percent, and a combined global turnover of less than 1 million ECUs). Id.
70. Id. art. 5.
71. Id. art. 6.
72. See generally BERMANN, supra note 44.
73. Id. at 771-73.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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By restricting the block exemption to joint venture partners with
less than 20 percent of the existing market, the Commission has fa-
vored the cooperation of small market players while maintaining its cir-
cumspection of large enterprises forming agreements to monopolize
markets. However, the utility of the block exemption is undermined
when companies are unable to adequately protect their proprietary data
and still qualify for the exemption.7 6
III. RECENT CHANGES EASING E.U. REGULATION
The deluge of routine notifications and the subsequent strain on
the Commission's limited resources provided the catalyst for recent ef-
forts to speed the clearance/exemption process. To this end, the Com-
mission has issued a variety of notices and regulations broadening ex-
emption criteria. In the joint venture area, the Commission chose to
differentiate between two types of joint ventures: concentrative and co-
operative - a distinction with key ramifications for business.
A. Concentrative versus Cooperative Joint Ventures"7
The distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ven-
tures critically impacts the handling of joint venture approval in the
E.U. Both cooperative and concentrative joint ventures "involve the
creation of a new company performing activities to a greater or lesser
extent independent from their [sic] parents, and they [sic] almost inevi-
tably involve significant sunk costs."'78 A concentrative joint venture,
however, is acted upon by the Commission within a maximum of five
months but probably within thirty days.7 On the other hand, there are
no time constraints for Commission action concerning a cooperative
joint venture.80 While the difference in treatment of the two joint ven-
tures is dramatic, the actual differences in the business ventures are
much harder to discern.
76. Id. at 773 (citing V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETI-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE 12.5 (4th ed. 1990)).
77. The distinction between merger-like concentrative joint ventures and coopera-
tive joint ventures is alien to U.S. law, which scrutinizes all joint ventures by merger
standards but provides exemption procedures. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of
Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61
ANTITRUST L. J. 937, 945 (1993).
78. Jones, supra note 34.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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1. Concentrative Joint Ventures
Concentrative joint ventures are merger-like enterprises establish-
ing an autonomous business which operates in fields unrelated horizon-
tally or vertically to its parent companies.8 1 Concentrative businesses
fall under Regulation 4064/89 (hereinafter the "Merger Regulation")
of 1989 if they are of a "community dimension.18 2 When concentrative
rather than cooperative joint ventures are formed, not only are strict
time deadlines imposed on the Commission,"3 but member state laws do
not apply 4 and the venture is permanently cleared; Article 85(3) ex-
emptions, in contrast, force ventures into limited duration.
When classifying joint ventures as concentrative or cooperative,
the Commission examines a variety of factors. The Merger Notices5
lists requirements for concentrative ventures.8 6 Among the require-
ments are the following:
o Joint control must exist:"7 The parent companies must agree
81. Council Regulation 4064/89 (the "Merger Regulation") on The Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 at art. 3(2):
An operation, including the creation of a joint venture, which has as its object
or effect the coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings which
remain independent shall not constitute a concentration within the meaning of
paragraph 1(b).
The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions
of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to coordination of
the competitive behavior of the parties amongst themselves or between them
and the joint venture, shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of
paragraph 1(b).
Id.
82. Id. Community dimension refers to aggregate business turnover which is cal-
culated pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Merger Regulation, supra note 10.
83. The Commission must reach a preliminary conclusion on the proposed concen-
tration within one month after receiving a completed notification. Merger Regulation,
supra note 10 at art. 10(1). If the Commission has doubts as to whether the thresholds
are met, it may conduct a:n investigation. Id. at art. 6(1)(c). Within four months of
opening an investigation, the Commission must make its final decision. The four-month
period may be "exceptionally" suspended where one of the concerned companies has
been responsible for the Commission having to request further information. Id.
84. Id. art. 21(2).
85. 1990 O.J. (C 203) 10.
86. Id. For a discussion of decisions under the Merger Regulation see Anand S.
Pathak, EEC Merger Regulation Enforcement During 1992, EUR. L. REV. cc132
(1993).
87. Id. See also Anand S. Pathak, EEC Merger Regulation Enforcement During
1992, EUR. L. REV. cc132 at cc138-39 (1993).
In the E.C., the term "joint venture" is a term of art. For purposes of E.C.
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on decisions concerning the joint venture's activities.88 Joint
control can be based on legal, contractual, or other means.
o The joint venture must perform "all the functions of an au-
tonomous economic entity."" It should not be dependent on the
parent companies for the development and maintenance of its
business.
o The joint venture must "not have as its object or effect the
coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings that
remain independent of each other." 90
In other words, if the joint venture operates in the same or similar mar-
kets as the parent companies, the joint venture will probably be deemed
cooperative. Therefore, the plausibly anticompetitive aspects in the ex-
isting market justify the stricter treatment of cooperative joint
ventures.
2. Cooperative Joint Ventures
If an agreement is deemed a "cooperative" joint venture, it falls
under Article 85.91 In 1993, the Commission updated its 1968 Notice
on assessing cooperative joint ventures.92 Under the latest guidance,
DG-IV will examine, inter alia:
o The effect of the joint venture on actual or potential competi-
competition law, a joint venture is an undertaking which is "jointly con-
trolled" by the parent companies, that is, each parent has rights, whether by
contract or otherwise, which confer the possibility of exercising decisive influ-
ence jointly with the other parents over the venture. For assessing the exis-
tence of joint control, the shareholdings of the parent companies in the ven-
ture are not dispositive; joint control may exist even though one of the parents
holds a minority stake in the venture but has certain rights in the manage-
ment of the venture which go beyond the normal protection of minority inter-
ests. Based on the Commission's practice, it is clear that a requirement under
the notified agreement that the parents vote unanimously on the annual budg-
ets, and strategic commercial and marketing plans, and any changes and
amendments thereto, would normally constitute conclusive evidence of joint
control.
Id.
88. Id. "There is no joint control where one of the parent companies can decide
alone on the JV's [joint venture's] commercial activities." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Notice Concerning the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures under Arti-
cle 85 EEC, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2.
92. Id.
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tion between the parent companies 9 ;
o The impact of the joint venture on third parties;94 and
o The competitive effect of a full-function joint venture on its
parents. 95
Once a restriction on competition is found, the Commission exam-
ines whether the effect of this restriction is "appreciable."
This depends mainly on the market power of the undertakings
concerned, the nature of the joint ventures activities in compar-
ison to those of its parents and the extent to which third parties
are foreclosed from the market .... [I]t follows ... that compe-
tition is not restricted where co-operation in the form of a joint
venture can objectively be seen as the only possibility for the
parents to enter a new market or to remain present in a market,
provided that their presence will strengthen competition or pre-
vent it from being weakened. 96
The Commission is zealous in its scrutiny of ventures demarcated
as "concentrations" and frequently refuses concentrative status to
agreements that the parent companies have designed to be
concentrative.97
93. Id. Potential competition is examined according to the list of questions in the
Commission's 13th Competition Report. Id.
94. Id. For example, a joint venture could foreclose market entry for its competi-
tors if the joint venture partners have significant market power and control vital raw
materials needed by competitors. 1990 O.J. (C 203) 10.
95. Notice Concerning the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures under Arti-
cle 85 EEC, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2. See generally Dana W. Hayter, Scapegoat for the
Trade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures Place the United
States at a Competitive Disadvantage?, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 391, 392
(1993).
96. Jones, supra note 34 at cc30.
97. Griffin, supra note 32 (commenting that numerous companies label all busi-
ness ventures "concentrative" in an attempt to expedite approval of the venture and
gain clearance - even to the point of making fundamental changes in the structure
and scope of the venture. Nevertheless, the Commission frequently finds the agree-
ments non-concentrative.); See Renault/Volvo (Case No. IV/M004, Nov. 7, 1990); 4
C.M.L.R. 297 (1991); Mediobanca/Generali (Case No. IV/M159, Dec. 19, 1991);
Flachglas/VEGLA (Case No. IV/M168, Apr. 13, 1992); Apollinaris/Schweppes (Case
No. IV/MO93, June 24, 1992); Elf/Enterprise (Case No. IV/MO88, July 24, 1991);
Sunrise (Case Nol IV/M176, Jan 13, 1992).
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3. Structural Cooperative Joint Ventures
A new breed of joint ventures, called "structural cooperative joint
ventures" has recently been recognized by the E.U.98 Effective January
1, 1993, DG-IV instituted a new, self-imposed procedure in an effort to
expedite approval for cooperative joint ventures, probably due to the
inundation of notices of concentrative joint ventures.9 9 The new proce-
dure requires the Commission to issue a letter within two months of
receiving notification.100 The Commission will inform the company that
the structural cooperative joint venture may proceed or warn the com-
pany that the Commission views the planned venture as anticompeti-
tive.101 DG-IV also develops a specific timetable for each "second-stage
case and the parties are informed of the deadline the Commission has
set for itself to render a final decision. 9102
B. EFTA - A New Player in E.U. Competition Law
In addition to understanding the shifting regulatory framework
within the E.U., businesses must now comply with the requirements of
a new competition entity. On January 1, 1994 the European Free-
Trade Agreement (hereinafter "EFTA") Surveillance Authority
emerged 03 as the European Economic Area (hereinafter "EEA")
Agreement went into effect. The Surveillance Authority is the func-
tional equivalent of DG-IV and oversees member compliance with the
EEA rules.104 The EEA created the "world's largest free trade
98. See generally JOHN P. KARALIS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRAC-
TICAL GUIDE (West 1992) ("Joint Ventures may be either structural or contractual, or
both. They also may conform to a statutory or other regulatory scheme. The coopera-
tive relationship may be broad based or narrowly defined .... Long term joint ven-
tures, particularly those that are broad based, usually are best suited to a corporate
structure. Short term or narrowly defined joint ventures often are better formulated
contractually.") Id. § 1.11.
99. COMPETITION POLICY, 1991 WL 11703 (D.R.T.), Eurupdate database,
§7.7.2 Acceleration of Procedures, at 245. "These deadlines have no statutory force
however and will be merely of persuasive force for the time being." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Griffin, supra note 32, (characterizing these structural joint ventures as "al-
most concentrative . . .full-function[ing] . . .free-standing" ventures.) Id.
103. EEA: The World's Biggest Free Trade Area, ECONOMIST, January 8, 1994,
available in DIALOG, Int-news File.
104. Telephone interview with Phillip Combs, Office of European Union, Depart-
ment of Commerce (March 28, 1995).
The Surveillance Authority is responsible for ensuring that EFTA members
fulfill their obligations under the European Economic Area. As such, it has
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zone,"'' 0 incorporating the twelve members of the European Union
with the five members of the European Free-Trade Association - Aus-
tria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Iceland. 106 The EEA's basic pre-
mise, similar to that of the Treaty of Rome, is the free movement of
goods, capital, services, and people.'
Despite initial controversies over the jurisdiction of the EFTA Sur-
veillance Authority08 and the EFTA Court, 0 9 compromises have been
reached. EFTA Surveillance Authority will decide cases where the ef-
fects are restricted to trade between Austria, Finland, Iceland, Nor-
way, and Sweden, as well as cases involving firms with turnover on
EFTA territory equal to or exceeding thirty-three percent of the turno-
ver on EEA territory, except where trade with the E.U. is affected."10
Responsibility is shared out in the same way for negative clear-
ance applications (Article 54 of the EEA Agreement) when the
whole EEA territory is concerned by a dominant position. On
certain powers comparable to the New European Commission - especially in
the fields of competition, state aid, and procurement. The [Surveillance Au-
thority] has the power to investigate infringement of EEA rules and to admin-
ister fines accordingly. The [Surveillance Authority] is governed by an inde-
pendent board made up of five members, one from each participating
member's state. The [Surveillance Authority] is based in Brussels and has a
staff of about 100.
Id.
105. EEA: The World's Biggest Free Trade Area, ECONOMIST, January 8, 1994,
available in DIALOG, Int-news File.
106. Id. Austria, Sweden, and Finland recently joined the EU bringing the num-
ber of EU Member States to fifteen. Telephone interview with Nathaniel Herman,
Trade Information Hotline (1-800-USTRADE), (March 28, 1995).
107. EEA: The World's Biggest Free Trade Area, ECONOMIST, January 8, 1994,
available in DIALOG, Int-news File.
EEA has been a long time coming. EFTA was created in 1960 more or less as
a reaction to the European Economic Community, dominated by France and
Germany. The mutual antipathy began to dissolve with bilateral free-trade
agreements after 1973, and was dispelled in 1984 when EFTA and the Euro-
pean Community signed an agreement to create a so-called 'European Eco-
nomic Space'.... A second reason for the delay has been the sheer difficulty
of getting EFTA countries to accept the EU's legal strictures against monopo-
lies and state aid.
Id.
108. The Surveillance Authority is based in Brussels. Interview with Phillip
Combs, supra note 104.
109. The Court is based in Geneva. Id.
110. EU: EC Competition Rules To Be Applied Throughout EEA Territory,
Agency Europe, January 7, 1994, available in DIALOG, Int-News File.
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the other hand, if the dominant position only exists in the Com-
munity, requests must be addressed to the Commission and, if
it only exists on EFTA territory, to the EFTA Surveillance Au-
thority. Finally, Community-scale concentrations naturally re-
main under the responsibility of the Commission."'
The EFTA Surveillance Authority has adopted guidelines which
correspond with E.U. competition rules."1 For example, notices on ex-
clusive distribution agreements and the "de minimis" notice excluding
agreements of minor importance from the competition rules have been
adopted by the EFTA Surveillance Authority.1'" Companies had to
comply with the rules by July 1, 1994 although the rules governing
concentrations and abuse of a dominant position have been in effect
since January 1, 1994.114
In response to the emergence of the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
the Commission has adopted new notification forms for companies re-
questing individual exemptions or negative clearances under Article 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.1 5 The Commission will also examine
111. Id.
112. EFTA: EFTA Surveillance Authority Approves First Text On Competition,
Jan. 13, 1994, available in DIALOG, Int-News File. Specifically, the Authority
adopted ten notices and guidelines, identical to those of the E.U., to clarify EEA com-
petition. The ten notices adopted cover:
1. Concentrations (enterprise transfer, joint acquisitions, concentrative joint-
ventures);
2. Cooperative or concentrative nature of joint ventures;
3. Exclusive distribution or purchasing agreements which benefit from exemp-
tion under Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement;
4. Distribution and services agreements;
5. Exclusivity contracts with commercial agents who are exempted;
6. Agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which are not considered
mergers;
7. Import of goods from third countries which would be obstacles to trade in
the EEA or lead to unfair competition;
8. Sub-contracting agreements;
9. Agreements of minimum importance (businesses with less than 5 % market
share With annual turnover of less the 200 million ECU);
10. Restrictions on competition in telecommunications.
Id.
113. EU: EFTA Surveillance Authority Adopts Competition Notices, European
Commission Press Releases, Eur. Comm'n. Press Releases, Jan. 13, 1994, available in
DIALOG, Int-News File.
114. Id.
115. EC: Commission Adopts New Notification Forms Due To EEA Agreement,
Eur. Comm'n Press Releases, Dec. 20, 1993, available in DIALOG, Int-News File.
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whether the notifications are within the scope of Articles 53 and 60 of
the EEA Agreement.11 6 When necessary, the notifications will be for-
warded to the EFTA Surveillance Authority in accordance with Proto-
cols 23 and 24 to the EEA Agreement.""
It remains unclear how the EFTA and E.U. authorities will, in
practice, cooperate and coordinate competition policy.'" The intent,
however, is clear. EFTA intends to maintain the policies behind E.U.
competition law while extending the scope of the law. For the practi-
tioner, it is certain that yet another regulatory body, complete with its
own court, must now be added to the list of regulatory obstacles that
joint ventures must surmount. To the extent the policies of the E.U. are
mirrored by EFTA, the impact and cost to businesses will be
minimized.
IV. EUROPEAN DECISIONS
The decisions of the Commission granting, denying, or requiring
revisions to existing agreements illustrate the highly subjective analysis
required to determine whether an exemption or negative clearance
should be granted. By employing a "rule of reason" analysis,11 9 the
Commission has left a trail of decisions which provide little guidance
for businesses attempting to structure acceptable joint venture
agreements.
A. Are All Non-Minor Agreements Caught by Article 85(1)?
Not all Commission decisions hinder exclusive joint venture ar-
rangements. The Commission seems to be especially permissive with
116. Id. "[C]ompanies may, with the exception of merger control cases, hand in
their notifications not only, pursuant to those same Protocols, in any official Commu-
nity language, but also in an official language of the EFTA States or the working
language of the EFTA Surveillance Authority." Id.
117. Id.
118. To date, only one case has been handled under the EEA agreement. The
concentration - a planned merger of the petrochemical businesses of Finland's Neste
Oy and Norway's Den Norske Stats Oljeselskab - was approved by the Commission
to form a 50-50 joint venture called Borealis. "A spokesman for the EFTA surveillance
authority said the Commission had cleared the merger as under the EEA agreement it
held on to any competence it already had to deal with mergers." Belgium: EU Ap-
proves Neste/Statoil Venture, Reuter Newswire, Feb. 18, 1994, available in DIALOG,
Int-News File.
119. The rule of reason analysis is used by the United States' Department of Jus-
tice to evaluate the legality of joint ventures under the National Cooperation and Re-
search Act of 1984, supra note 11.
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regard to joint ventures which focus on European R&D. In SHV/Chev-
ron,120 the companies formed a joint venture to sell petroleum products
in the E.U. This agreement - a harbinger of the "concentrative" joint
venture - was granted a negative clearance by the Commission."'
The Commission viewed the joint venture as similar to a partial merger
because the companies transferred all of their related assets to the joint
venture. 2 These assets included their independent distribution net-
works and related plant equipment. In addition, the companies agreed
to withdraw from distribution of the products and were unlikely to re-
turn to the market.1
By viewing the agreement as a partial merger, the Commission
effectively allowed a permanent exclusive agreement to be formed be-
tween the companies.1 24 The Commission also allowed the non-competi-
tion clause to stand, thereby ensuring that the new venture would re-
ceive no competition from its parents. 1
2
The Commission's recent permissive decisions in AEG/Alcate
126
and Elopak 1 27 rendered Article 85(1) inapplicable to the ventures in
each case.1 28 In AEG/Alcatel, a consortium of major German, French,
and Finnish electronics and telecommunications firms formed a venture
to develop, manufacture, and sell digital cellular mobile phones
throughout the E.U.129 At the time the consortium was formed, six
other consortia were being formed for the same purpose.130 The Com-
mission permitted the venture by granting a negative clearance.131 It
reasoned that the investment cost and time schedule did not permit the
individual players to compete in the same industry.1 82 Hence, there was
no threat of unfair competition to avoid.
The Commission also granted a negative clearance for a joint yen-
120. Commission Decision 75/95, 1975 O.J. (L 38) 14.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik (AEG, Alcatel and Oy Nokia),
Commission Decision 90/46, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19.
127. Elopak/Metal Box-Odin, Commission Decision 90/410, 1990 O.J. (L 209)
15.
128. Id.
129. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik (AEG, Alcatel and Oy Nokia),
Commission Decision 90/46, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19.
130. BERMANN, supra note 44, at 797.
131. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik (AEG, Alcatel and Oy Nokia),
Commission Decision 90/46, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19.
132. Id.
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ture in Elopak.183 The joint venture was established to develop and ex-
ploit a new-carton and carton-filling technology.134 The agreement in-
cluded grants of non-exclusive licenses and restrictions on the use of
industrial knowledge after termination of the joint venture. 3 5 The
Commission decided that the parties were not competitors because they
occupied different sectors of the packing industry and were unlikely to
undertake the development risk independently. 3 6 Competition was not
distorted, therefore, and the restrictions in the agreement were
reasonable.,3 7
These decisions reflect the Commission's permissiveness towards
joint R&D where European companies are involved. Given the global
competitiveness of technology and the significant economic gain to be
realized, the Commission almost certainly will continue to view pan-
European technology joint ventures more benignly.
B. If Caught by Article 85, What Merits Exemption Under 85(3)?
The Commission does not automatically condemn agreements
which clearly fall within the scope of Article 85. Exemptions are avail-
able and are liberally granted for joint ventures involving R&D al-
though past Commission decisions are inconsistent.
In Vacuum Interrupters,38 the Commission granted an exemption,
withdrew it when a larger buyer of the product joined the joint venture,
and later granted a second exemption' as new competitors emerged in
the market place. Initially, two large UK firms initiated independent
research on a new switching technology before concluding that the re-
search was too expensive to pursue individually. "0 After abandoning
their individual research, these companies joined together to form a
joint venture."' The Commission viewed the agreement as falling
within the scope of Article 85(1) because the two firms remained com-
petitors. " " Nevertheless, the Commission exempted it under Article
133. Elopak/Metal Box-Odin, Commission Decision 90/410, 1990 O.J. (L 209)
15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Commission Decision 77/160, 1977 O.J. (L 48) 32.
139. Vacuum Interrupters, Commission Decision 80/1332, 1980 O.J. (L 383) 1.
140. VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 111 (3d ed.
1986).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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85(3). The exemption, revoked when the product's buyer joined the
venture, was reinstated later as competition in the newly created mar-
ket grew. 4
The Commission's holding that the initial joint venture was en-
compassed by Article 85(1) is confusing in light of the fact that the
technology did not exist at the time the joint venture was formed; as a
result, potential competition was unlikely to exist since other firms
faced market barriers.14 4 The competitors that eventually entered the
market were licensees of the joint venture. 14 The Commission viewed
the "loss of the highly improbable but conceivable potential competi-
tion . . . as having both the object and effect of restricting
competition.'1 4 6
In De Laval/Stork,14 7 the Commission removed provisions of an
agreement and conditioned the granting of an exemption.' 48 The joint
venture agreement involved an American company, De Laval, and its
technology licensee, Stork, jointly producing and distributing compres-
sors and turbines in the E.U." 9 The companies' consumers consisted of
large power companies and the joint venture partners' combined mar-
ket share was approximately ten to fifteen percent. Significant competi-
tion existed from multi-national corporations.1 50 The joint venture
agreement dealt only with production and manufacturing of the tur-
bines.' No R&D was included in the agreement. 15
While the Commission ultimately accepted the De Laval/Stork
agreement, it did so only after mandating changes in its exclusivity and
licensing provisions. 53 The Commission found the concessions already
made by the companies to be inadequate and required that consumers
be able to approach either company directly in the event the joint ven-
ture was unable to satisfy the consumers' requirements.1' To effect the
Commission's fiat, the joint venture's exclusivity provisions were made
operable only for the first phase of the joint venture. The Commission
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Commission Decision 77/543, 1977 O.J. (L 215) 11.
148. Regulation 17, supra note 17, art. 8(1) permits the Commission to attach
conditions and obligations to a declaration of exemption. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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viewed any exclusivity beyond the initial phase as not "indispensable"
to the agreement.1 55
The Commission's refusal to accept the De Laval/Stork
agreement as originally proposed was probably due in part to the Com-
mission's misperception of the market effects of the joint venture. Be-
cause the companies would undoubtedly realize increased profits and
productivity gains from their cooperation, the Commission seemed to
view them as the sole beneficiaries of the agreement. Moreover, as no
R&D was included in the joint venture, no new products were being
brought to market. Therefore, the Commission reasoned, consumers
were unlikely to appreciably benefit from the agreement, except possi-
bly from increased ease of service.
This analysis fails to reach the likely net effect of the terms of the
agreement. First, efficiency gains would almost certainly result in lower
cost to the consumers, and ultimately, lower cost to the EEC. Given the
companies' small combined market share, monopolistic pricing was un-
likely. Substantial price increases would further reduce the partners'
market share, given the existing competition.
Furthermore, the Commission failed to analyze the role of the con-
sumer in De. Laval/Stork. Major electricity companies, capable of exer-
cising significant countervailing pressures on De Laval, were not the
type of consumers likely to be disadvantaged from the cooperation of
the two companies. Had the cooperation acted like a monopoly or car-
tel, the calculus clearly would have differed. However, the relatively
small market share, the power of the consumers, and the efficiencies
likely to result from the cooperation strongly suggest that the Commis-
sion was overzealous in its application of Article 85. Such caution un-
necessarily hampers joint venture formation by removing the exclusiv-
ity incentives that, in large part, entice companies to pool scarce
resources in a gamble to increase profits.
The problems faced by the De Laval/Stork agreement could have
been avoided if the agreement was structured as R&D, subsequent pro-
duction, and marketing of improvements to the existing turbine tech-
nology. By incorporating R&D, and since the companies, though com-
petitors, occupied less than twenty percent of the market, the block
exemption criteria would have been satisfied. The cooperation and pro-
duction could continue as long as the party's market share did not ex-
ceed twenty percent.
Currently, the Commission appears to be adopting a more prag-
matic, favorable view of such innovative cooperation, especially when a
155. Id.
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benefit to the E.U. or its consumers is evident. In United Technologies/
MTU, " the Commission exempted a long-term joint venture for com-
mercial aircraft engines, finding that the joint venture partners were
not at the same level of competition in the jet engine market and the
largest market share in the relevant E.U. market was nineteen percent.
The agreement provided for coordination of existing programs and
R&D.157
In Ford/Volkswagen,158 the Commission approved a fifty-fifty joint
venture to develop and produce a multi-purpose vehicle in a new Portu-
guese plant:
The cooperation enables the partners to competitively offer a
high-quality product, designed for the specific needs of Euro-
pean consumers, in the relatively new and low volume MPV
market segment in a comparatively short time .... [T]he bene-
ficial results of the cooperation could not, to that extent, be
achieved otherwise. The partners, each acting on its own, could
not develop and produce the MPV in the same conditions so
rapidly and efficiently in Portugal as their cooperation will en-
able them to do. "
In Exxon/Shel,' 60 the joint venture to produce linear low density
polyethylene (LLDPE) in France was approved by the Commission af-
ter substantial modifications to the parties' original agreement. The
Commission objected and required that all dispensable restrictions be
removed from the agreement. In granting an exemption, the Commis-
sion considered the fact that this venture would establish the first plant
of its kind in the Community. The Commission stated that the venture
"implie[d] a high degree of production flexibility," enabling the French
plant to produce different grades at a cost attractive enough to consum-
ers to encourage conversion of old equipment.' 6' Moreover, the Com-
mission noted that the venture would not eliminate competition with
respect to a substantial part of the market. 62
In DuPont/Merck,I'l the Commission issued a comfort letter for a
156. 1992 O.J. (C 279) 2; 4 C.M.L.R. 84 (1993).
157. 1992 O.J. (C 279) 2; Jones, supra note 34, at cc38.
158. 1993 O.J. (L 20) 14.
159. Id.
160. 1993 O.J. (C 92) 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Press Release 1P(91)381, May 6, 1991.
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fifty-fifty joint venture for pharmaceuticals. The Commission reasoned
that the venture "will add a new and substantial competitor on the
world market rather than eliminate a competitor through a merger."' "
This new competitor would enhance consumer choice, create new em-
ployment, and bring important new drugs to the market in a relatively
short time, hence contributing to technical and scientific progress.1 65
In these four cases, the Commission demonstrated increased flexi-
bility towards joint ventures in high-technology areas. All of these ven-
tures were designed to improve state-of-the-art technology. Through
these ventures and their resulting technology gains, the E.U. as a whole
benefits with regard to competitors in the United States and Asia. In
addition, a concomitant benefit is realized by E.U. consumers through
reduced prices and/or greater availability of goods. While the Commis-
sion exerted its influence on the provisions of the Exxon/Shell agree-
ment, the overall tolerance for joint venture agreements appears
greater today than when the Commission decided the De Laval/Stork
and Vacuum Interrupters cases.
A useful contrast is provided by Screensport/EBU,166 one of the
rare cases in which the Commission refused to exempt a joint venture.
The joint venture in question was one establishing a transnational satel-
lite channel dedicated to sports broadcasting. The Commission was not
convinced that the joint venture was indispensable given the backing of
the venture by its only potential competitor.1 67 In addition, the implied
restrictions on competition were not vital, nor was there a concomitant
benefit to consumers.' 68 Perhaps by materially changing their venture,
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 1991 O.J. (L 63) 32.
167. Id.
[T]he Commission is not convinced that a transnational sports channel such
as Eurosport could only come into existence on the basis of such a joint ven-
ture between a group of members of the EBU [European Broadcasting
Union], with the backing of the organization itself, and the most likely main
competitor capable of creating an alternative venture. .. . [T]he creation of a
joint venture on the basis of the present Agreements is excessive, and the
implied restrictions of competition cannot be regarded as indispensable to the
establishment of a dedicated sports channel with a transnational dimension
capable of rivalling other sports channels to the benefit of the consumers.
Id.
168. Id.
[T]he consumer may be better served by being able to make an informed
choice between at lest [sic] two channels offering an equally wide variety of
European sports programmes, including the major international events, which
may differ in style, presentation, quality and content. In those circumstances,
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the parties could have obtained an exemption, but the fact that the
channel would eliminate competition in sports broadcasting and did not
involve high technology development probably outweighed all other fac-
tors. This decision underscores the limits on the Commission's tolerance
of restrictive joint ventures which provide no scientific gains and elimi-
nate competition.
C. Decisions Under the Merger Regulation - Still Little
Consistency
Although presented to the Commission as "concentrative" joint
ventures, often in an attempt to expedite DG-IV action, many joint
ventures fail to satisfy the Commission's test for concentrations. In
Baxter/Nestle,169 the Commission deemed a venture to jointly develop,
manufacture, and market clinical nutrition products as having failed to
qualify as a concentration.170 The Commission's reasoning was based
on the revocability of the exclusive technology licenses by the parents,
the parents' continuing role in manufacturing as subcontractors, and
the parents' role in continuing to conduct the majority of relevant
R&D.1 71
[T]he parents did not effect a complete and permanent with-
drawal from the ... markets but have kept their joint ventures
dependent on access to their research and development, technol-
ogy, manufacture and trademarks. The parties also have the
possibility of reverting at any time to the previous position. This
applies in particular to Baxter, which retains the necessary dis-
tribution channels to hospitals and pharmacies for its other
pharmaceutical products. These distribution channels can at
any time be used for the distribution of clinical nutritional
products.1 72
In sum, the joint venture parents remained active in the market in vio-
lation of Commission rules.
Industrial policy goals have also led to inconsistent Commission
it is the consumer who decides ultimately which/how many channels of this
kind should eventually succeed.
Id.
169. Case No. IV/MO58, Feb. 6, 1991.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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decisions under the Merger Regulation. 1" For example, in Aerospa-
tiale/MBB,"'7 a helicopter joint venture was approved despite the ad-
verse effect on E.U. competition. "Presumably, the Commission took
into account arguments that the joint venture would permit more effec-
tive competition against American rivals and discounted the cost to
consumers of a more concentrated market.' 7 5 Conversely, the Com-
mission later refused to be swayed by industrial policy concerns in Aer-
ospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland"' involving a proposed joint venture for
turbo-prop aircraft. For the first time, the Commission declared a con-
centration incompatible with the Common Market, believing the joint
venture would constrict E.U. competition." 7
In the narrowly approved Steel Tubes Venture,1 8 DG-IV's merger
task force initially opposed the venture between French, Italian, and
German companies based on the fact that, if allowed to proceed, a
"dominant duopoly"' 9 would be formed. 18° The task force did not dis-
cuss ties between parents or allege collusion. The venture was ap-
proved, probably more a result of politics than economics.''
D. Why the Different Treatment?
The factors considered by the Commission to distinguish concen-
trations from cooperative joint ventures are apparent: concentrations,
like mergers, create a new company and the potential collusion between
competitors is theoretically eliminated when the parents withdraw from
the joint venture's business area. While the idea of concentrations is
that the new company will be competing in the market place with other
similar companies, this is often not the reality. Rather than benefitting
173. See Alyssa A. Grikscheit, Are We Compatible?: Current European Commu-
nity Law on the Compatibility of Joint Ventures with the Common Market and Pos-
sibilities for Future Development, 92 MICH. L. REv. 968, 1019-21 (1994).
174. Aerospatiale/MBB, Commission Decision of 25 February 1991, 1991 O.J. (C
59) 13.
175. Grikscheit, supra note 173, at 1020.
176. Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Commission Decision of 2 October 1991,
1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.
177. Id.
178. Andrew Hill, Commission Is Split On Steel Tubes Venture, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1994, at 2. The three companies would occupy 36 percent of the market, while
Sweden has 33 percent and Spain has 15 percent. Id.
179. Griffin, supra note 32.
180. Id.
181. The Commissioners' votes followed country lines with the DG-IV Director
abstaining and the Italian, French, and German Commissioners voting in favor of ap-
proving the venture. Griffin, supra note 32.
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consumers, concentrations can leave fewer firms competing in the mar-
ket. They ultimately create one new company to operate exclusively
where two or more had once competed.
In the SHV/Chevron venture, the new company had few competi-
tors and the collaboration was more likely to result in cooperative, mo-
nopolistic practices than two competing parent companies forming a
joint venture. This is even more probable in regulated industries such
as petroleum production where there are fewer market players and less
competition. Moreover, this exclusive cooperation was in perpetuity,
unlike shorter term joint ventures such as the De Laval/Stork and Vac-
uum Interrupters. These shorter-term joint ventures leave two compa-
nies in the market place following the dissolution of the venture. Also,
each has the capability to supply consumers with their products.
The Commission also appears blindsighted by the transfer of as-
sets in a concentration from the parents to the new venture. While this
signals a relinquishing of control of the market, it also represents a
concentration of the business in one entity guaranteed to face no com-
petition from its parents. Moreover, the concomitant benefit to consum-
ers and furtherance of E.U. competition policy appears less in many
concentrations, as in the SHV/Chevron case, where two competitors are
effectively eliminated. In the final analysis, many concentrations appear
more likely to act in contravention of the Treaty of Rome principles
than cooperative joint ventures.
Recent cases, such as AEG/Alcetal and Elopak, involved attempts
to compete globally and develop cutting-edge technologies. Unlike the
SHV/Chevron and De Laval/Stork joint venture agreements, these co-
operative efforts focused on R&D. The Commission's tolerance of the
restrictions contained in the agreements reflects its recognition that,
without certain exclusive benefits to the companies and protections for
technology, the companies are unlikely to cooperate and pool invest-
ment. While the Elopak companies were deemed not to be competitors,
they did constitute major players whose cooperation would effect the
competitiveness of the market. Despite this fact, the Commission super-
ficially dismissed this problem by deciding that they would not have
undertaken the R&D efforts alone due to cost. Elopak, with facts iden-
tical to that of Vacuum Interrupters thereby received an opposite anal-
ysis by the Commission. While the Commission's decisions are enig-
matic and brightline rules are almost nonexistent, the Commission's
approach appears to reflect its recognition that the benefits of coopera-
tive research and development typically outweigh the problems caused
by the anti-competition effects of the agreement, at least in the short
term.
The Commission recently issued a notice to help demystify their
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process of exemption and clearance pursuant to Article 85.182 Among
the key criteria which the Commission purports to examine are the
following:
1. Is the joint venture likely to prevent, restrict, or distort competi-
tion between the parents? 183
2. Will the joint venture's operation appreciably affect the compet-
itive position of third parties (i.e., regarding supplies and sales)? '"
3. If the venture is a full-function business, what is the relationship
between the parent and the joint venture?1 85
Despite the listing of criteria to be examined by DG-IV in grant-
ing exemptions or clearances, there is room for improvement. Legal un-
certainty continues to plague businesses forming new ventures due to
the subjectivity of the analysis.
Industry finds it difficult to judge whether an agreement is cov-
ered by the European regime. In theory, the Commission's ju-
risdiction extends only where an agreement has a significant
and foreseeable effect on intra-state trade within the EU. In
practice, the test as to whether there is such an effect is so wide
as to make it virtually impossible for companies to say with any
precision that the rules do not apply to any particular agree-
ment. Uncertainty is increased by the Commission's continued
assertion of jurisdiction in cases where the effect on intra-Union
trade appears insignificant. 186
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The serious criticisms leveled at DG-IV's practices and procedures
have led-to suggestions for improvement.187 The Confederation of Brit-
ish Industry has launched a six-point plan for reform of competition
policy. In addition, the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities is calling for improvement in the Commission's
handling of competition cases. 88
182. Notice on the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures Pursuant to Article
85(1) and 85(3), 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2.
183. Id. para 17.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Robert Rice, Business and The Law: A Burden on Business - EU Competi-
tion Law Has Come Under Fire For Wasting Time, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1994, at 16.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Among the recommendations currently being considered are those
to abolish the turnover element of the "de minimis"' '89 test under Arti-
cle 85, to raise substantially the market threshold under the "de
minimis"' 90 test, and to revamp the block exemptions in order to guide
companies towards drafting agreements which do not need Commission
clearance.'91 The thrust of these recommendations is to narrow the
scope of businesses encompassed by the treaty and provide clear, objec-
tive criteria for the evaluation of agreements.
Meanwhile, for the practitioner, structuring a joint venture to fit
the E.U. guidelines can save time, expense, and provide a modicum of
legal certainty. The following are the key routes to E.U. approval:
Type of Agreement Notice Required? Results?
DE MINIMIS (Under OSTENSIBLY, NO PENALTIES IF
5% MARKET SHARE) NOTICE REQUIRED NOTICE WAS
ACTUALLY
REQUIRED
BLOCK EXEMPTION NO NOTICE PENALTIES IF
AGREEMENT REQUIRED. IF NOTICE WAS
UNCERTAIN ACTUALLY
EXEMPTION REQUIRED AND WAS
PERTAINS, NOTIFY NOT UNDERTAKEN
AND DG-IV MUST
ACT WITHIN 6
MONTHS OR
EXEMPTION APPLIES.
CONCENTRATIVE NOTICE REQUIRED, DG-IV OFTEN RULES
JOINT VENTURE DG-IV MUST ACT THAT JV IS NOT
WITHIN 1 MONTH CONCENTRATIVE
STRUCTURAL NOTICE REQUIRED, COULD SURPASS
COOPERATIVE JOINT DG-IV MUST ACT TWO MONTHS IF
VENTURE WITHIN SELF- SECOND-STAGE
IMPOSED DEADLINE INVESTIGATION IS
OF TWO MONTHS LAUNCHED
*NOTIFICATION OF NOTICE REQUIRED DG-IV CAN FORCE
ART. 85(1) JOINT PER REGULATION 17, AMENDMENTS TO
VENTURE FOR WAIT OF APPROX. 18 JOINT VENTURE
INDIVIDUAL MONTHS. NO FINES AGREEMENT,
CLEARANCE UNDER WILL ACCRUE REMAINING TERMS
ART. 85(3) DURING WAITING NOT VOIDED.
PERIOD IF
*OFTEN DONE AGREEMENT FOUND
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO VIOLATE
TREATY.
189. Notice Concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 26.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Type of Agreement Notice Required? Results?
REQUEST COMFORT SHORTER WAITING NOT BINDING ON
LETTER PERIOD. SEEN BY NATIONAL COURTS;
SOME AS ADMISSION NOT TECHNICALLY
THAT AGREEMENT AN EXEMPTION BUT
VIOLATES ART. 85 INCREASES
POSING PROBLEMS LIKELIHOOD THAT
WITH JV WILL NOT BE
CONTRACTUAL QUESTIONED
ENFORCEMENT OF
AGREEMENT IN
NATIONAL COURTS.
*NOTIFICATION- NOTICE REQUIRED IF NOT CLEARED,
REQUEST FOR PER REGULATION 17; MUST NOTIFY AND
NEGATIVE WAIT OF APPROX. 18 REQUEST 85(3)
CLEARANCE UNDER MONTHS. NO FINES EXEMPTION.
ART. 85 (1) WILL ACCRUE
DURING WAITING
PERIOD IF
AGREEMENT FOUND
TO VIOLATE
TREATY.
NOTIFY EFTA RULES TO DATE COVERS NORWAY,
SURVEILLANCE IDENTICAL TO DG-IV SWEDEN, ICELAND,
AUTHORITY IF FINLAND, AND
APPLICABLE AUSTRIA
NOTIFY MEMBER RULES VARY FROM PENALTIES CAN BE
STATE COMPETITION MEMBER STATE TO LEVIED IN
AUTHORITY IF MEMBER STATE NATIONAL COURTS
APPLICABLE
(MERGERS,
CONCENTRATIVE
JVS ARE EXEMPT
FROM MEMBER
STATE LAW)
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission has come a long way towards improving its previ-
ously enigmatic procedures for approval. Through notices on criteria
for exemption and deadlines for reaction to notification, the Commis-
sion appears to be striving to improve its tarnished image and oft-criti-
cized reputation. 19 E.U. and U.S. antitrust authorities are now cooper-
ating in antitrust matters: greater uniformity in decision making should
192. The Merger Task Force has created its own internal coordination shop to
examine inconsistent decisions in recognition of their inconsistencies. Griffin, supra
note 32.
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result. 198
The Commission's disparate conclusions as to the acceptability of
the agreements are almost certainly a product of the inherent subjectiv-
ity involved in assessing whether the terms of the agreement ultimately
help or hinder competition, result in a benefit to E.U. consumers, and
are "indispensable." While time and the reality of cutthroat technologi-
cal competition appear to have softened the Commission's outlook, a
company's best bet seems to lie in block exemptions or concentrations,
if it is able to qualify (i.e. market share is small enough, etc.). By fall-
ing within block exemptions, the companies are insulated from fines
and avoid the rigorous scrutiny of the Commission under Regulation
17.194 The Merger Regulation ensures that a quick approval or rejec-
tion will be forthcoming from the Commission.195
Absent the applicability of these approaches, a company has no
choice but to comply by notifying the Commission. The best insurance
for securing a negative clearance appears to be careful drafting of ex-
clusivity provisions to avoid overbreadth, coupled with compelling argu-
ments indicating a benefit to the consumer and community. Through
these approaches, joint ventures may escape the Commission's scrutiny
and interference.
The Commission, unduly motivated by politics and market percep-
tions, needs to focus on providing clear policy decisions which can
guide businesses in structuring their ventures. Waiving fines for post-
notification periods and distinguishing between concentrative and coop-
erative joint ventures is a poor panacea for an unfair and inefficient
process. More objective criteria and broader exemption regulations
would better serve the business community while ensuring that the
E.U.'s goals are accomplished. In sum, the policies of Articles 85 and
86 are clear and laudatory, while the criteria for exemption are not.
A. Lynne Puckett
193. Agreement Between the Commission of the European Communities and the
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Their Com-
petition Laws, signed Sept. 23, 1991.
194. Regulation 17, supra note 18.
195. Merger Regulation, supra note 10.
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